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It is difficult to underestimate the level of excitement and 
optimism about the ability of artificial intelligence (AI) to address 
the most pressing challenges facing society.1 The potential to solve 
a wide range of complex, challenging problems – in such diverse 
areas as poverty reduction, education, healthcare delivery, and 
transportation – seem boundless.2 In healthcare, for example, 
doctors are using AI to anticipate medical complications, resulting 
in more successful treatments, faster recoveries, and lower costs.3 
In transportation, “smart vehicles” powered by AI could save 
thousands of lives each year by preventing accidents to which 
human drivers are prone.4  
AI is fast being adopted throughout all sectors of the 
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1 Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT: NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON 
TECHNOLOGY 5 (Oct. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_o
f_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSG8-2X43]; Brad Smith & Harry Shum, The Future 
Computed: Artificial Intelligence and its Role in Society, MICROSOFT 48 (2018), 
https://news.microsoft.com/uploads/2018/02/The-Future-Computed_2.8.18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8DWA-HGYP].  
2 Smith et al., supra note 1. 
3 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1. 
4 Smith et al., supra note 1, at 49. 





economy, with AI research and development experiencing rapid 
growth.5 AI already can be found in everyday technologies such as 
GPS navigation systems, cellphones, and smart home appliances.6 
At the heart of these technologies are powerful algorithmic 
processes that make determinations or predictions based on subtle 
patterns of behavior in the data they are fed and on which they are 
trained.7 Advocates for AI believe that AI can and will produce 
more accurate and objective decisions, provide far more 
personalized experiences, and promote economic efficiency by 
matching consumers with the products and services they most want 
or need.8  
Yet the nature of AI itself, and how it is currently being 
designed and implemented, presents deep normative legal and 
ethical challenges to our existing social, economic, and political 
relationships and institutions.9 A core aspect of AI systems is that 
the algorithmic decision-making processes they employ are largely 
automated and frequently hidden from the public. Yet, the 
decisions they make can be highly consequential for individual 
autonomy and opportunity. AI is increasingly making consumers’ 
decisions for them. But because consumers cannot check what 
criteria an AI system uses, the AI is only as good as the data it is 
trained. 
Programmers, regulators, and the public alike often imbue 
AI and algorithmic decision-making with an aura of objectivity, 
accuracy, and fairness. Despite these assertions, humans are 
involved in the design, training, and application of AI systems; 
accordingly, human values are embedded at each level of AI 
design, training, and application.  AI often makes errors because 
the underlying software and algorithms (written by humans) are 
faulty or the training data (input by humans) is biased. Even 
though AI can improve our decision making capabilities, these 
kinds of errors run the risk of creating or reinforcing unfairness 
and other systemic problems.10 For example, despite claims that 
risk assessment tools provide a more objective measure of the 
likelihood of recidivism, researchers have found the algorithms 
powering those tools are written in a way that inaccurately 
identifies black defendants as future criminals more often than 
 
5 Alex Campolo, Madelyn Sanfilippo, Meredith Whittaker & Kate Crawford, AI 
Now 2017 Report, AI NOW 3 (2017), https://ainowinstitute.org/ 
AI_Now_2017_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MSJ7-NZF3].  




10 Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the 
Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 129 (2018). 




These risks mean that the public has a strong interest in 
ensuring that AI systems are designed and implemented justly.12 
Despite widespread consensus on the need to ensure fairness in this 
area,13 to date, regulation of AI has been limited, and the 
regulations that do exist are mostly sectoral and industry specific. 
Given the rapid development and increasing deployment of AI, a 
far more comprehensive and coordinated approach toward AI 
governance that promotes fairness in the public interest without 
overburdening innovation is needed.  
As an emerging technology, AI poses significant regulatory 
challenges. The disproportionate allocation of technical knowledge 
and expertise between industry and regulators compounds these 
obstacles.14 These challenges make the traditional, top-down 
command-and-control approach to regulation ill-suited to AI 
governance. Instead, a co-regulatory model that combines industry 
self-regulation and stakeholder involvement with government 
oversight is much more promising, at least in the near term. While 
some have called for the creation of a new overarching federal 
agency to regulate in this area, given the difficulty of enacting any 
major new legislation that impacts powerful interests, 
Congressional action or any chance of a new oversight body is 
unlikely.15  
A federal agency already exists, however, that is both 
familiar with and experienced in regulating new and emerging 
technologies and can step in now to fill the AI regulatory hole. 
Even with its limited resources, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) has proven adept at working with industry in the area of 
data protection, closing many of the “gaps” left by the sectoral 
approach to privacy regulation in the United States.16 The FTC has 
done so largely through its broad powers granted under Section 5 
 
11 Julie Angwin & Jeff Larson, Bias in Criminal Risk Scores Is Mathematically 
Inevitable, Researchers Say, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www. 
propublica.org/article/bias-in-criminal-risk-scores-is-mathematically-inevitable-
researchers-say [https://perma.cc/2752-DQ2X]. 
12 Brauneis et al., supra note 10, at 123.  
13 Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 399, 415 (2017). 
14 Abbey Stemler, Regulation 2.0: The Marriage of New Governance and Lex 
Informatica, 1 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 87, 103 (2016) (quoting Cristie L. 
Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities 
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 28 (2008)). 
15 Cameron F. Kerry, Will This New Congress Be the One to Pass Data Privacy 
Legislation?, BROOKINGS (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
blog/techtank/2019/01/07/will-this-new-congress-be-the-one-to-pass-data-
privacy-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/M2Q2-4U3K].  
16 Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data 
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2233 (2015). 





of the FTC Act which allows it to regulate “unfair and deceptive 
practices.” AI and its applications fall under the scope of that 
language and are thus regulatable by the FTC. Further, Congress 
can and should increase the FTC’s resources and give it greater 
rule-making authority. This will allow the FTC to more effectively 
meet the challenges that AI presents and will continue to present in 
the future.  
 
II. AI AND ITS GROWING INFLUENCE 
 
AI consists not of a single technology, but a set of 
algorithmic processes and computational methods and tools 
employed in a range of tasks – such as speech and voice 
recognition, vision, language translation, reasoning, and robotics – 
that attempt to emulate human capabilities.17 These technologies 
are being incorporated across every industry.18 AI technologies, 
furthermore, are developing rapidly;19 the development of self-
driving cars being just one example.20 Engineers have developed 
AI programs with the ability to master highly complex games in 
just a matter of hours.21 And AI-powered drones are now making 
their appearance in our skies.22   
 
A. The Drive Behind the Growth of AI 
 
This trend has been fueled by big improvements in the 
quality of algorithms, especially in the area of machine learning,23 
 
17 Urs Gasser & Virgilio A.F. Almeida, A Layered Model for AI Governance, 
HARV. UNIV. 2 (Nov. 20, 2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/343 
90353/w6gov-18-LATEX.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/9J6C-QQLC]; 
Smith et al., supra note 4, at 32-33. 
18 Michael Guihot, Anne F. Matthew & Nicolas P. Suzor, Nudging Robots: 
Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 385, 395 (2017).  
19 Id. at 403-04; Gasser et al., supra note 17, at 1. 
20 Luke Dormehl & Stephen Edelstein, Sit Back, Relax, and Enjoy a Ride 
Through the History of Self-driving Cars, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 3, 2019), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/cars/history-of-self-driving-cars-milestones/ 
[https://perma.cc/RQ5R-QXF9] (noting that “[s]eemingly within just a few 
years, autonomous cars have gone from science fiction fantasy to road-bound 
reality”). 
21 Samuel Gibbs, AlphaZero AI Beats Champion Chess Program After Teaching 
Itself in Four Hours, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2017/dec/07/alphazero-google-deepmind-ai-beats-champion-
program-teaching-itself-to-play-four-hours [https://perma.cc/H57L-5ZCF].  
22 Angelica Stabile, AI-powered Drone Racing May Be the Next Big Sport, FOX 
BUS. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/ai-powered-drone-racing-
may-221355086.html [https://perma.cc/5NMA-B3CJ]. 
23 Machine learning refers to a range of AI techniques that detect patterns within 
data, which are then used to make automated decisions or predictions. Harry 
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30 
by increases in the speed and power of networks and cloud 
computing, and the exponential growth in the ability of the tech 
industry to capture, store and process massive amounts of 
consumer data.24 These developments have been enhanced by the 
significant progress that has been made in machine sensing, 
perception, and object recognition.25  
Much of the demand and economic incentive for 
developing and employing AI is driven by the desire to monetize 
data.26 Indeed, the commercial applications for AI seem limitless, 
with the largest tech companies investing heavily in the potential to 
commoditize the technology.27 These trends are only likely to 
accelerate with the next generation of AI systems.28  
 
B. Machine Learning, Complexity, and 
Unpredictability 
 
As consumer interactions with AI systems increase, those 
systems will be making more and more decisions vis-a-vis the data 
they process that can limit consumers’ own ability to choose or 
decide, mostly without their knowledge.29 The range of potential 
applications “is so wide that it is not clear that any element of 
human life would remain untouched by machine learning.”30 Many 
of these decisions will be made automatically, with little human 
oversight or control, which is a major feature that distinguishes AI 
 
Surden, Values Embedded in Legal Artificial Intelligence, UNIV. OF COLO. L. 3 
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2932333## [https://perma.cc/A32B-8TAS].  
24 Campolo et al., supra note 5, at 3; STAN. UNIV., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AND LIFE IN 2030, ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
(Sept. 2016), https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ 
ai_100_report_0831fnl.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2LX-A6EV]. 
25 STAN. UNIV., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030, ONE HUNDRED 




27 ION STOICA ET AL., UNIV. OF CALIF. AT BERKLEY, A BERKELEY VIEW OF 
SYSTEMS CHALLENGES FOR AI 1 (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www2.eecs. 
berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2017/EECS-2017-159.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TBM2-XP78]; Guihot et al., supra note 18, at 402. 
28 STOICA ET AL., supra note 27.  
29 Id. 
30 Chris Reed, Elizabeth Kennedy & Sara Nogueira Silva, Responsibility, 
Autonomy and Accountability: Legal Liability For Machine Learning, QUEEN 
MARY UNIV. OF LONDON, SCH. OF LAW 30 (Oct. 17, 2016), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2853462 [https://perma.cc/Q5B7-
HXAE].  





from prior technologies.31  
Another distinguishing feature of AI is its unpredictability. 
The behavior of machine learning algorithms, for example, is 
almost by definition unpredictable.32 Instead of being specifically 
programmed to deal with a particular problem, these algorithms are 
programmed to learn how to solve problems in general, being 
taught how to do so first under controlled conditions, and then in 
the real world.33 The algorithms learn patterns and relationships in 
the data they are fed and trained on, and build models of the 
processes involved based on those patterns and relationships.34 
But how machine learning algorithms “learn” and how they 
“reason from experience to practice” can seem quite foreign to 
humans.35 Adding to the complexity and opacity of the machine 
learning and reasoning process is the algorithms’ ability to 
improve how they perform over time based on what they have 
learned.36 Further, machine learning algorithms do not learn or 
reason as humans do, which makes their decisions even more 
difficult to predict or explain.37  
As a result, the growth of machine learning means we will 
be entrusting significant aspects of our lives to algorithmic 
processes that we do not understand.38 Indeed, we may fast be 
approaching a time when extremely sophisticated algorithms will 
themselves decide what information is relevant to consider in 
making a determination based only on “the vaguest of goals,” 
thereby becoming essentially self-reliant and autonomous.39 In 
many applications, machine learning algorithms are able to match 
or surpass human-level performance.40 Clearly, machine learning 
will have significant implications, especially in regard to 
individual autonomy, dignity, and self-determination.  
Machine learning algorithms also can be extremely fast and 
complex, categorizing and processing large amounts of data in 
fractions of a second.41 And they are highly dynamic, constantly 
 
31 Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, 
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 362-63 
(2016).  
32 Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 87 (2017).  
33 Id. 
34 Reed et al., supra note 30, at 4. 
35 Tutt, supra note 32. 
36 Surden, supra note 23, at 3. 
37 Tutt, supra note 32. 
38 Id. at 87-88. 
39 Id. at 98-100. 
40 Id. at 100; STOICA ET AL., supra note 27, at 1. 
41 Tutt, supra note 32, at 94; Digital Decisions, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. 
3 (2018), https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Digital-Decisions-Library- 
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adjusting and changing their “rules” to fit patterns in the data.42 In 
this way, machine learning algorithms can end up making 
decisions based on criteria that in many cases may not have been 
explicitly chosen or anticipated, even by the humans who program 
them.43 Further, algorithms frequently interact with other 
algorithms, making it extremely difficult in many instances to 
predict the various factors that influence an algorithm’s behavior 
and decision-making.44  
This kind of unpredictable, but useful, behavior that arises 
in machine learning algorithms is known as “emergence.”45 
Emergence is a central goal of the AI field because it reduces the 
amount of time needed to train a learning algorithm.46 Thus, rather 
than having to code every behavior of the algorithm, programmers 
can instead simply set the algorithm’s goals and then train it to 
accomplish those goals.47 And, because machine learning 
algorithms learn from their previous behavior, they continue to 
improve over time, even without the aid of their human 
operators.48  
Not only can machine learning algorithms handle far, and 
many, more complex rules than humans, their emergent nature also 
can lead to solutions that humans would not have thought of.49 For 
example, machine learning algorithms often are able to find subtle 
relationships in data that humans tend to overlook or fail to 
recognize entirely.50 They can do so because learning algorithms 
operate based on correlations between data points, allowing them 
to uncover reliable, though incidental, relationships in the data, 
even though those correlations may defy causal explanation.51 For 
these reasons, we often do not – and in many instances cannot – 
 
Printer-Friendly-as-of-20180927.pdf [https://perma.cc/H747-J8BW]; Joan 
Donovan, Robyn Caplan, Jeanna Matthews & Lauren Hanson, Algorithmic 
Accountability: A Primer, DATA & SOCIETY 2 (Apr. 18, 2018), https://datasocie 
ty.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Data_Society_Algorithmic_Accountability 
_Primer_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY8W-AL8P] (noting that algorithm can 
encode “for thousands of variables across millions of data points”). 
42 Brauneis et al., supra note 10, at 131; Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of 
Algorithms, MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES 12-13 (Nov. 26, 2012), http://6.asset. 
soup.io/asset/3911/8870_2ed3.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6C9-MH8F]; CTR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & TECH., SUPRA note 41, at 7. 
43 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 41. 
44 Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 
534 (2015) [hereinafter Robotics]. 
45 Id. at 532. 
46 Id. at 538-40. 
47 Id. at 538-39; Andrew D. Selbst and Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of 
Explainable Machines, 97 FORDHAM LAW REV. 1085, 1098 (2018). 
48 Robotics, supra note 44, at 539. 
49 Id.; Selbst et al., supra note 47. 
50 Selbst et al., supra note 47 
51 Brauneis et al., supra note 10, at 130.  





know exactly how a machine learning algorithm arrives at its 
decision, or whether that decision is fair or accurate.  
 
C. AI as Power Broker and Arbiter of Information 
Flow 
 
These algorithms, which have become endemic to much of 
our social and digital media landscape, are at the heart of AI, 
driving its technologies and making crucial decisions about what 
information consumers can see or access across that landscape – 
and the opportunities that access may open or limit for us – can 
have serious impact on many aspects of our lives.52 Thus, in many 
ways, they are acting as society’s “new power brokers,” making 
lightning-fast consequential decisions without the benefit of human 
oversight.53  
For example, even more aspects of our lives are being 
“quantified and ranked” by algorithms, resulting in a “scored 
society.”54 In addition to recidivism risk assessment tools that 
score defendants on the basis of their likelihood to offend,55 
lenders and other financial institutions are turning increasingly to 
consumer credit scoring models powered by Big Data and machine 
learning algorithms.56 Such scoring can disparately impact 
vulnerable populations and other marginalized sectors of society.57  
 
52 Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 807 
(2015); CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 41, at 3; Meg Leta Jones, 
The Ironies of Automation Law: Tying Policy Knots with Fair Automation 
Practices Principles, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 77, 85 (2015); Iyad Rahwan, 
Society-in-the-Loop: Programming the Algorithmic Social Contract, THE MEDIA 
LAB 4 (July 20, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.07232.pdf 
 [https://perma.cc/35FG-FKWS]; Nicholas Diakopoulos, Algorithmic 
Accountability Reporting: On the Investigation of Black Boxes, COLUMBIA 
JOURNALISM SCH., TOW CTR. FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM 2-3 (Dec. 2013), http:// 
towcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/78524_Tow-Center-Report-WEB-
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2HH-Z8MU].  
53 Hartzog, supra note 52; Iyad Rahwan, Society-in-the-Loop: Programming the 
Algorithmic Social Contract, THE MEDIA LAB 4 (July 20, 2017), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.07232.pdf [https://perma.cc/35FG-FKWS]; Nicholas 
Diakopoulos, Algorithmic Accountability Reporting: On the Investigation of 
Black Boxes, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM SCH., TOW CTR. FOR DIGITAL 
JOURNALISM 2-3 (Dec. 2013), http://towcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/02/78524_Tow-Center-Report-WEB-1.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/B2HH-Z8MU].  
54 Hartzog, supra note 52. 
55 John Lightbourne, Damned Lies & Criminal Sentencing Using Evidenced-
Based Tools, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 327, 331-32 (2017); Katherine Freeman, 
Algorithmic Injustice: How the Wisconsin Supreme Court Failed to Protect Due 
Process Rights in State v. Loomis, 18 N.C. J. OF L. & TECH. 75, 81 (2016). 
56 Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 163 (2016). 
57 Hartzog, supra note 52, at 808. 
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Learning algorithms are also taking on a bigger role in 
determining who gets access to resources and who is able to take 
advantage of crucial opportunities.58 Credit scoring is one area 
where the impact of these algorithms is being felt. Credit risk 
assessment tools can adversely affect access to economic 
opportunities because they rely on data (often inaccurate) collected 
from a myriad of sources in a non-transparent manner, making it 
difficult for consumers to verify or challenge the scores they 
produce.59 And despite claims of greater objectivity in predicting 
who should get access to financial resources, there is no certainty 
such tools are actually designed to predict creditworthiness, and, in 
fact, may increase existing bias in the lending industry by scoring 
consumers based on their religious, community, and familial 
affiliations, as well as such factors as race or gender.60  
Many AI systems are beginning to directly impact the 
physical environment.61 These range from modern flight control 
systems in commercial aircraft, to accident-prevention safety 
features in today’s self-driving cars, to robot sailboats scouring the 
ocean for data.62 Furthermore, some systems provide sensitive 
services that, when performed by people, would require training 
and certification, such as robots that perform surgical procedures 
by themselves and other autonomous AI systems deployed in areas 
traditionally requiring board or bar passage from human 
practitioners and subject to fiduciary obligations like providing 
legal, healthcare or financial advice.63  
Algorithmic decision-making processes also constitute “a 
key logic governing the flows of information on which we 
depend,” guiding our understanding of the world and the decisions 
we make.64 As such, they can be understood as “encoded 
geographies” that “configure and circumscribe” humans and how 
we live our lives.65 In many digital domains, for example, 
algorithms are the arbiters that define what data is relevant, making 
 
58 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 41. 
59 Hurley et al., supra note 56, at 166.  
60 Id. at 167.  
61 Calo, supra note 13, at 417. 
62 Id.; John Markoff, No Sailors Needed: Robot Sailboats Scour the Oceans for 
Data, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/05/ 
technology/no-sailors-needed-robot-sailboats-scour-the-oceans-for-data.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q9K3-J28R].  
63 Calo, supra note 13, at 417-19. 
64 Gillespie, supra not 42; Finale Doshi-Velez and Been Kim, Towards a 
Rigorous Science of Interpretable Machine Learning 1 (Mar. 2, 2017), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.08608.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2P3-FFSR].  
65 Lucas D. Introna, Algorithms, Governance, and Governmentality: On 
Governing Academic Writing, LANCASTER UNIV. 26 (2016), http://www. 
research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/files/84096709/STHV_final_author_version_introna.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4AMX-38DC].  





legitimate certain matters that are worthy of attention, while 
reducing the legitimacy of others.66 Where the algorithms that 
power social networks and search engines provide users with 
personalized, and therefore “ultimately skewed,” results, those that 
filter the news “narrow what we know, surrounding us in 
information that tends to support what we already believe.”67 In 
essence, AI can and does dictate much of the information we can 
or cannot find online. 
In a very real sense then, the algorithmic decision-making 
processes that comprise AI act as a “form of governance,” 
managing individual consumer behavior, allocating resources, and 
opening up or closing off opportunities.68 Yet, while these 
automated systems are becoming increasingly embedded into our 
lives, ordering how we behave and interact digitally in various 
ways, they mostly “are shrouded in secrecy,” operating in the 
background largely beyond human control.69  
To the extent the decisions that such systems make are 
more accurate and objective, they contribute to economic growth 
and social progress and have a positive impact overall,70 some 
level of opacity and absence of control is not necessarily 
problematic. Indeed, there is well-founded hope that AI can be 
more objective than human decision-makers, can augment human 
judgment in useful ways, and can reduce bias, leading to better 
outcomes overall.71 In a number of ways, however, the very nature 
of AI systems and algorithmic decision-making is problematic, 
calling into question exactly how accurate, objective, and fair it 




66 Id. at 26; Joan Donovan, Robyn Caplan, Jeanna Matthews & Lauren Hanson, 
Algorithmic Accountability: A Primer, DATA & SOCIETY 3 (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://datasociety.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Data_Society_Algorithmic_Accountability_Primer_FI
NAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY8W-AL8P] (“[O]ur digital engagements . . . 
become part of algorithmic, automated, and artificially intelligent sorting 
mechanisms that can either target or exclude us.”).  
67 Megan Anderle, How Facebook and Google’s Algorithms Are Affecting Our 
Political Viewpoints, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.huffpost. 
com/entry/how-facebook-and-googles-_b_8282612  
[https://perma.cc/2LC6-Z6QU].  
68 Brauneis et al., supra note 10, at 114. 
69 Introna, supra note 65, at 26-27; Hartzog, supra note 52, 807; CTR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 41. 
70 Diakopoulos, supra note 53, at 2; EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
supra note 1, at 39. 
71 Kate Crawford & Meredith Whittaker, Artificial Intelligence is Hard to See, 
MEDIUM 4 (Sept. 11, 2016), https://medium.com/@katecrawford/artificial-intell 
igence-is-hard-to-see-a71e74f386db [https://perma.cc/9VDQ-XYK3];  
Campolo et al., supra note 5, at 4. 
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III. THE CONCERNS AI RAISES 
 
A major concern with AI systems is that they are becoming 
integrated into our economic, social, and political landscape 
without any rigorous study or validation of their accuracy or 
objectivity.72 Because machine learning algorithms have become 
so prevalent in our information ecosystem and are making 
decisions in relation to the data they are fed and trained on that are 
of significant consequence to consumers, how those algorithms are 
designed, operate, and interact with consumers matters.73 
Algorithms not only control how we access information, 
communicate with others, and learn about the world, but in many 
ways they lead us “to internalize their norms and priorities” as we 
navigate the digital environment.74 
What data an algorithm ultimately considers, what is 
excluded from its consideration, and how the data the algorithm 
relies on is made “algorithm ready”75 all influence the algorithm’s 
output or decision. These factors reflect the choices the algorithm’s 
designers make concerning the criteria by which the algorithm 
determines what is relevant.76 Those criteria, though, are often 
obscured from the public.77 Rarely do algorithm designers reveal 
how the criteria they employ “are measured, how they are weighed 
against one another, what other criteria have also been 
incorporated, and when, if ever, these criteria will be 
overridden.”78  
 
A. Lack of Consumer Awareness 
 
Consumers are all too frequently unaware, or not fully 
aware, of how companies use machine learning and other 
algorithms to thoroughly track users’ online activity.79 Indeed, 
although they encounter algorithms every day, consumers often do 
not realize that algorithms are at work, let alone what it is they 
actually do.80 For example, consumers largely fail to recognize the 
 
72 Crawford et al., supra note 71. 
73 Gillespie, supra note 42; Selbst et al., supra note 47, at 3. 
74 Gillespie, supra note 42, at 20-21. 
75 Id. at 2-5. Before data can be fed to an algorithm, it must be collected, and 
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76 Id. at 2. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 10. 
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80 Solon Barocas, Sophie Hood & Malte Ziewitz, Governing Algorithms: A 
Provocation Piece, prepared for the “Governing Algorithms” conference, N.Y. 
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extent to which the designers of algorithms are conducting 
research to understand and “operationalize” how people 
“habitually seek, engage with, and digest information,” or that the 
results of this research are then used in the design of the underlying 
algorithms to better shape user behavior.81 Even if users are aware 
of such activity, they often have no ability to challenge it.82  
Consumers also are often unaware of the extent to which 
algorithms are employed to track their online activity across linked 
websites, and the incentives those algorithms are designed to create 
for consumers to remain within that information ecosystem.83 
Algorithms allow the gathering of large amounts of each 
consumer’s data into an ever increasingly comprehensive profile, 
which is then used to determine access to information, resources, 
and opportunities.84 However, most consumers do not think much, 
or at all, about the algorithmic criteria that underlies these 
processes.85 Rather, as long as the decision-making systems 
provide consumers with what they desire, consumers tend to view 
the decision-making systems as unproblematic: an answer, a 
solution, or, more often, simply entertainment.86  
To the extent consumers are aware of the algorithms in 
their lives, their view is vague, simplistic, and frequently a 
fundamental misunderstanding of how algorithms operate.87 
Algorithms tend to be seen as impartial “stabilizers of trust,” 
offering “practical and symbolic assurances that their evaluations 
are fair and accurate, and free from subjectivity, error, or attempted 
influence.”88 No algorithmic system is completely free of human 
influence, so this view depends on the tech industry’s “carefully 
crafted fiction” of accuracy and objectivity.89 Further, given 
algorithms’ “aura of mechanistic legal neutrality,” consumers are 
likely to give more deference to their decisions and 
 
81 Gillespie, supra note 42, at 8. 
82 Id. at 7. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 2, 7.  
85 Id. at 12. 
86 Id.  
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88 Id. at 2, 13; Joan Donovan, Robyn Caplan, Jeanna Matthews & Lauren 
Hanson, Algorithmic Accountability: A Primer, DATA & SOCIETY 2-3, 8 (Apr. 
18, 2018), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Data_ 
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[https://perma.cc/DY8W-AL8P] (noting that algorithms appear as “unbiased 
calculations because they take in objective points of reference and provide a 
standard outcome,” that they “are attractive because they promise neutrality in 
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89 Gillespie, supra note 42, at 13. 




Machine learning algorithms largely operate behind the 
scenes of AI decision-making systems.91 The constant dynamic 
changes that the algorithms undergo tend to be obscured from the 
public, making it extremely difficult to assess them for bias.92 In 
addition, it is difficult to challenge the reasoning behind a 
machine’s decision or evaluate the objectivity and accuracy of AI 
decision-making systems because of the inscrutable nature of 
machine learning and other AI decision-making systems, a natural 
consequence of their inherent complexity.93 Consumers may be 
wholly unaware, for example, of just how precisely tailored search 
engines are to their preferences.94 Nor may they understand that 
search results for the exact same query can vary quite widely 
depending on who conducts the search precisely because of how 
specifically tailored those search engines are.95  
Consumers are not only generally unaware of the sheer 
volume of unseen decisions being made about them by algorithms, 
but they also tend to not comprehend the sheer complexity and 
scale of these systems.96 Nor does the public seem to be aware that 
there is often a level of uncertainty in the operations of even the 
most sophisticated machine learning algorithms and, therefore, in 
the decisions those algorithms make.97 The level of opacity that 
surrounds most machine learning systems obscures their inner 
workings, either due to proprietary protection considerations or to 
the emergent nature of the systems’ algorithms, making them 
difficult to understand even by those who design them.98  
 
90 Brauneis et al., supra note 10, at 126. 
91 Gillespie, supra note 42, at 12. 
92 Id. at 12-13; Crawford et al., supra note 71, at 2-3. 
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ELISH, AARON PLASEK & KADIJA FERRYMAN, THE AI NOW REPORT: THE 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
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House and New York University’s Information Law Institute); Ethically Aligned 
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and Autonomous Systems, THE INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS 
ENGINEERS 90 (Sept. 2016) [hereinafter IEEE], http://standards.ieee.org/ 
develop/indconn/ec/ead_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XSF-GN9P].  
97 IEEE, supra note 96. 
98 Gillespie, supra note 42, at 10; John Danaher, Is Effective Regulation of AI 
Possible? Eight Potential Regulatory Problems, PHILOSOPHICAL DISQUISITIONS 
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B. Value Choices and Bias in AI Design 
 
 Because an algorithm’s decision is imbued with a level of 
uncertainty, the decision can be wrong. One reason for error is the 
training data on which the algorithm learns is biased or 
unrepresentative of the real world.99 The data can also exhibit 
long-standing structural inequalities,100 and because machine 
learning algorithms rely on the ability to analyze useful patterns in 
large volumes of data, such flaws can be particularly 
problematic.101 Errors also can result from faulty reasoning, 
criteria, or factor weighing by the algorithm.102 Yet, given the 
“probabilistic and emergent” nature of machine learning 
algorithms and the opacity of AI systems, the public will rarely 
become aware of them.103  
Algorithms are value-laden. The designers of algorithms 
must make a series of decisions about how they will operate and 
what they can or cannot do.104 These decisions include what 
features the algorithm should have, what criteria to emphasize, 
what data to use, and how to analyze and present that data.105 Each 
of these design decisions reflects a specific set of human choices 
and value-propositions that determine what the algorithm will 
consider relevant.106 Given the ubiquity of AI and machine 
learning systems, such decisions and choices act as “powerful 
assertions about how things are and are supposed to be.”107  
Because AI research and development is largely driven by 
industry, the design of AI systems and other algorithmic processes 
is likely to take on the values of industry.108 The result is that the 
rights and values of the individual consumer, such as consent, 
privacy, and transparency, may be ignored, overlooked, or de-
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103 Tutt, supra note 32, at 90; Crawford, supra note 71, at 3. 
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emphasized.109 Further, because of this result, the decisions that go 
into designing AI algorithms are often made with little to no input 
from those most affected by them.110  
 
C. Fairness, Expectations, and Control of AI 
 
In addition to the values that algorithms embody, AI 
systems also impact other values society finds important, such as 
privacy. Machine learning techniques tend to reduce privacy by 
their ability to detect patterns within large volumes of data and to 
make easier the aggregation of what were previously disparate data 
points.111 This capacity to recognize subtle data patterns that 
humans cannot “threatens to eviscerate the already unstable 
boundary between what is public and what is private.”112 In this 
way, AI is increasingly able to provide insights into sensitive or 
intimate details of consumers’ lives, which consumers themselves 
may never have intended to share.113  
 Another potential concern is that the automated decision-
making processes at the heart of today’s AI fundamentally differ 
from those of humans, leading to the generation of solutions that 
humans would never have intended or expected.114 Humans tend to 
expect technology to behave according to the same formal and 
informal norms to which they hold other humans.115 Machine 
learning algorithms, however, are not bound by the cognitive 
limitations that the human brain is subject to.116 For example, 
humans lack the capacity to analyze much of the information at 
their disposal, particularly when faced with time constraints.117 Not 
so for machines.  
The computational power of machine learning algorithms 
means that they are far more capable than their human counterparts 
of identifying possibilities within the data in a given amount of 
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111 Surden, supra note 23, at 4. 
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time.118 That is, AI systems can come to conclusions that deviate 
substantially from those humans might typically expect or find 
acceptable: 
 
Because AI systems are not inherently limited 
by the preconceived notions, rules of thumb, 
and conventional wisdom upon which most 
human decision-makers rely, AI systems have 
the capacity to come up with solutions that 
humans may not have considered, or that they 
considered and rejected in favor of more 
intuitively appealing options.119 
 
Yet, it is precisely the ability of machine learning algorithms to 
generate unique and unexpected solutions to problems that makes 
their use attractive to industry.120  
People tend to demand that relationships in the decision-
making processes they encounter be intuitive, even though the 
solution the algorithm comes up with may be more “accurate” or 
“objective.”121 This demand reflects the human desire to ensure 
there is some way to assess whether the basis of the process is 
sound.122 Further, as the decision-making processes of machine 
learning algorithms become more and more opaque, humans will 
increasingly cease to have ultimate control over how decisions are 
made, even though such control is a fundamental assumption 
behind most laws and regulations.123 This lack of control raises the 
question of whether AI decision-making systems are beginning to 
regulate humans, rather than the other way around.124 
Similarly, the fact that much of the validity of machine 
learning algorithms relies on correlations between data points, 
rather than actual causation, holds important implications for the 
acceptability of the algorithms’ conclusions, at least from a human 
cognitive perspective.125 Those correlations can be highly 
circuitous, and the algorithm’s reasoning process – despite its 
complexity – tends to involve both simplifications and 
generalizations.126 For example, algorithmic rules are frequently 
induced from the behavior of entire populations, which is then 
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applied to specific individuals.127 This application can result in the 
situation where what can be known about an individual may now 
be as much dependent on the behavior of other people as on what 
the particular individual says or does.128  
Thus, while machine learning algorithms may be more 
accurate, objective, or fair – at least in a computational sense – a 
question arises as to whether they should be relied on, or relied on 
without human oversight, for the many consequential decisions 
impacting consumers. That is, from a policy perspective, we may 
find that AI’s decision-making processes are not entirely fair.129 
The need to ensure fairness is especially important given the 
general consensus that the public has a strong interest in those 
processes being employed justly.130  
The need to ensure fairness is all the more important 
because machine learning algorithms can worsen and perpetuate 
problems of unfairness through their ability “to scale” and thus to 
exert comprehensive and uniform influence on decisions, 
effectively magnifying any error or bias they may embody.131 For 
example, search engine algorithms are very selective about the 
particular data they consider, yet the decisions they make mask a 
variety of underlying subjective judgments about what data should 
be included or excluded, how it should be weighed, and how it 
should be emphasized or deemphasized.132 The possibility of error 
or bias infecting the decision-making process is always present.133  
 
IV. THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING AI 
 
 To date, very few laws or regulations specifically address 
the unique challenges that AI use poses.134 Looking forward, the 
legal system lacks the resources needed to make effective 
regulations that will keep up with AI’s rapid pace of research and 
development.135 The tech industry’s inherent complexities and 
tendency to reward “time-to-market at all cost” reinforce the 
pacing and other problems with governing AI effectively.136  
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A. AI and the Pacing Problem 
 
In addition to the sheer complexity of the technologies 
themselves, some of the major challenges to effective AI 
regulation are the scale, heterogeneity, and autonomous nature of 
many AI systems.137 These challenges are further complicated by 
the uncertainties about how and in what directions AI will develop 
in the future.138 The possibility that many of the risks that AI poses 
are likely unknown and may even be unknowable further impedes 
traditional methods of regulation.139 Indeed, the uncertainty around 
AI’s potential makes even categorizing the various risks of 
implementing AI a complicated and arduous task.140   
A major problem that regulators face regarding AI is that 
technological developments tend to outpace attempts to regulate 
them.141 Because of the increasing speed of innovation, the 
technology often disengages or decouples from regulation.142 This 
issue is known as the “pacing” problem, where attempts to “future-
proof” legislation result in regulatory disconnect, whereby the 
adopted regulations end up being either too general or too vague to 
provide meaningful oversight or guidance.143  
 
B. Regulators’ Disadvantages: Lack of Knowledge and 
Resources 
 
Of equal significance is the fact that many regulators do not 
have the resources to adequately address all of the issues that AI 
technologies present.144 This information and resource constraint 
can be particularly problematic in regard to new technologies, such 
as AI, because there is a steep learning curve and the ability to 
engage meaningfully with industry experts is necessary to gain the 
expertise needed to fully understand and act effectively in response 
to such advancements.145 Even with sufficient knowledge and 
expertise, the speed of innovation in the field makes it difficult for 
regulators to react in a timely and appropriate manner.146  
Regulators also are at a disadvantage given that most of the 
world’s AI is being developed by a handful of large multinational 
corporations, whose capabilities in the area far outstrip other 
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institutions, including the government.147 On one hand, this 
imbalance tends to exacerbate the opacity problem, since private 
firms are more apt to maintain secrecy over their technologies to 
safeguard their proprietary interests.148 These companies’ heavy 
investment in AI research and development also leads to 
“information asymmetries” between those companies and the 
regulators, the public, and others seeking to understand the 
technology.149 
Compounding the problem of information asymmetry is 
even if regulators are able to obtain information, they likely will be 
unable to fully understand the technology or appreciate its 
impacts.150 Indeed, especially when an emerging technology, like 
AI, is in its beginning stages, only those directly involved in 
developing the technology may possess the necessary expertise to 
adequately assess its risks.151 Further, given demand for such 
expertise, regulators are less likely to be able to compete with 
industry for top talent.152 As a result, regulators may be forced to 
overly rely on industry when attempting to regulate AI.153 
 
C. Sectoral Issues, Autonomy, and Unforeseeability 
 
Another complicating factor is that governance of AI is 
likely to be overseen by more than one regulator, given that while 
a particular type of AI may be widely adopted, it will be used by 
different industries in different ways.154 Moreover, as AI systems 
become increasingly integrated and embedded into the social and 
economic environment, the potential for systemic risk becomes 
amplified, affecting multiple stakeholders, jeopardizing the 
effectiveness of traditional regulatory models.155  
The nature of AI research and development also makes 
effective regulation more difficult. There are three general ex ante 
problems with regulating AI research and development:  
 
• discreetness (AI projects can be developed 
with little physical infrastructure, and 
without the need for large-scale, integrated 
institutional frameworks);  
• diffuseness (AI projects can be carried out 
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by a variety of diffuse actors in widely 
dispersed geographic locations); and 
• discreteness (parties can, without 
consciously coordinating with each other, 
make use of “discrete components and 
technologies ‘the full potential of which will 
not be apparent until the components come 
together’”).156  
 
Traditional regulators are generally ill-equipped to handle these 
issues.157  
Machine autonomy and algorithmic unpredictability pose 
other important regulatory concerns. It is inherently difficult trying 
to control the actions of autonomous systems, particularly when 
those systems’ decisions or actions are unforeseeable, even to their 
designers and operators.158 Indeed, the legal system is likely to 
struggle to manage these issues in such a way as to ensure 
aggrieved parties are adequately compensated when AI 
technologies cause harm.159 For instance, the legal system may 
view the behavior of some machine learning processes as so 
unforeseeable that it would be unfair to extend liability to their 
designers for harms they cause, leaving those injured thereby with 
little recourse.160 Moreover, because the workings of many AI 
systems are not visible to the public, it can be hard to detect when 
an AI system’s decision causes harm, or that the system even made 
the decision, making the concept of redress practically 
meaningless.161  
A related issue concerns AI systems acting in ways that can 
make them difficult for humans to control.162 In the most extreme 
case, an AI system becomes so much smarter and faster than its 
human counterparts, that it can no longer be controlled by humans 
at all.163 Flawed programming and design also can lead to loss of 
“local control,” which occurs when those humans who have the 
legal responsibility for controlling the AI system are no longer able 
to do so.164 Loss of control is especially problematic when the 
emergent nature of the AI system and the interests of its designers 
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are no longer in alignment with each other.165  
Given all of these challenges, new, innovative approaches 
to regulating AI are needed.166 The old state-centric, command-
and-control regulatory model is no longer adequate.167 As 
discussed below, while this does not mean that there is no role for 
government oversight or that regulators do not have an important 
part to play–indeed they do–rather it is that the growth of machine 
learning and the emergence of AI calls for a more inclusive, or co-
regulatory, approach. 
  
V. THE FTC AND CO-REGULATION:  
A MODEL FOR GOVERNING AI 
 
Given its sheer scale, complexity, heterogeneity, and 
autonomous nature, AI requires a systemic change to how it is 
regulated.168 As with other transformative technologies, a new 
approach is needed to preserve–or, if necessary, reexamine and 
rebalance–those norms and values that are negatively impacted by 
AI and that society deems important.169 Nonetheless, because it is 
difficult to know in advance what an emerging technology is 
capable of or exactly how it will be used, issues such as the pacing 
problem – where regulatory efforts ultimately end up being too 
general or vague to be effective – can arise.170 Further, for a new 
technology, some allowance for flexibility in terms of its design 
and implementation often is required to permit innovation.171  
 
A. New Regulatory Approaches 
 
Several new regulatory approaches have emerged in recent 
years to address these issues.172 One approach, co-regulation, 
combines industry delegation and self-governance with 
government oversight, making regulation a “shared responsibility” 
among relevant stakeholders.173 It brings legal treatment of the 
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technology in line with responsible design choices and practices.174 
This approach also tends to be far more responsive–producing 
better and quicker outcomes–to emerging technology 
environments, where there are many variables and heterogeneous 
actors and technological development is dependent on specific 
contexts and situations; such is the case with AI.175  
Another advantage of co-regulation is that it is often more 
effective at fostering technological innovation whereas state-
centered regulatory efforts risk overburdening innovators or 
stifling development prematurely.176 Co-regulation also allows a 
period of use and development of the technology during which 
regulators can discover and identify the particular risks or 
problems that later regulation can more appropriately address.177 
Simultaneously, government oversight is employed to exert the 
level of control necessary to protect the public from those risks and 
harms deemed to be unacceptable or undesirable.178 
 
B. The Promise of Co-Regulation 
 
 For government oversight of AI under the co-regulatory 
approach to be effective, a regulator with the ability and 
willingness to regulate more intrusively when needed is required. 
179 There  is some debate as to who that regulator should be. In 
regard to AI, some experts have proposed an overarching agency 
that has the power to establish a certification process for AI 
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systems.180 Another proposal contemplates the creation of an 
agency tasked with supervising the development, deployment, and 
use of algorithms.181 A unified federal commission also has been 
proposed for the field of robotics, and such an option could be 
applicable to AI in general.182  
 One reason for having a single, overarching agency are the 
efficiencies that it creates in terms of meeting the complex, 
systemic regulatory challenges that AI poses.183 Other agencies 
that might exert authority over only a small slice of the AI 
spectrum will lack the necessary expertise, or motivation to 
regulate its area of responsibility consistently and effectively.184 A 
single federal agency, on the other hand, can develop 
comprehensive, holistic policies rather than piecemeal regulatory 
efforts.185 It can quickly respond to new products, practices, and 
technological changes with more targeted “granular solutions” that 
better protect consumers.186 Furthermore, such an agency probably 
would be more capable of attracting industry talent and thereby 
build its own expertise.187  
In the United States, regulation of AI has taken the sector-
specific, multiple agency oversight approach.188 In the near term, 
there seems to be little movement toward taking steps toward 
regulating AI more comprehensively.189 And while Congress could 
move to create a new, overarching federal agency or to enact 
omnibus legislation dealing explicitly with AI, legislative 
inactivity over the past 15 years in the area of privacy – which 
itself has been significantly impacted by the rise of machine 
learning and other AI technologies – demonstrates that this 
prospect is fairly grim.190  
 
C. The FTC’s Approach to Regulating Technology 
 
 Yet, the United States is not without an agency that has 
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both the experience and expertise to step in now to fill the 
regulatory vacuum: the Federal Trade Commission. For example, 
the FTC has demonstrated its expertise in the field of privacy, 
which is an area with a similar history of inconsistent or lack of 
comprehensive regulation.191 In this field, the FTC has moved to 
assert its authority when industries have not been subject to 
regulation due to gaps in the country’s sectoral laws.192 In doing 
so, the FTC has shown an ability to bring a “layer of coherence” to 
the regulatory system that has solidified over the years.193 The FTC 
is more than capable of taking on the role of regulatory gap filler 
and coherent AI policy developer.  
Instead of simply imposing top-down, command-and-
control rules, the FTC has favored a self-regulatory approach to 
protecting consumer privacy, gradually developing that approach 
into a regulatory system that over time has become more robust.194 
In the privacy arena, the FTC has taken the position that protecting 
consumers through self-regulation is more flexible and cost-
effective than direct regulation, which at the same time allows for 
the pace of technological innovation to continue.195 Further, the 
norms the FTC has enforced over the years have been developed in 
accordance with industry stakeholders and consumer expectations; 
this enforcement strategy is in line with the co-regulatory model of 
governance.196  
 The FTC thus has been consistent in deferring to industry 
standards where appropriate, thereby avoiding the “dramatic 
regulatory lurches” that can accompany traditional top-down 
command-and-control regulation.197 Because such standards 
“dictate what is feasible in industry,” the FTC’s deference keeps its 
regulatory efforts from being disconnected from industry practice, 
and therefore from being arbitrarily implemented. 198 As a result, 
the FTC’s regulatory practices are both politically palatable and 
tend not to overly burden industry.199 AI can benefit from a 
similarly “light but steady regulatory approach,” through which the 
FTC can create an environment for AI to thrive, while also 
regulating to protect consumers and preserve public trust.200  
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D. Section 5 of the FTC Act 
 
The FTC’s primary source of regulatory authority is 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”201 
An unfair or deceptive act or practice is statutorily defined: (1) “a 
material ‘representation, omission or practice that is likely to 
mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to 
the consumer’s detriment’”; or (2) “a practice that ‘causes or is 
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.’”202 Section 5 thus bars both “unfair” and “deceptive” 
trade practices, as well as “unfair methods of competition.”203  
This legislative grant of authority is widely recognized as 
being extremely broad in scope.204 Generally, the FTC has the 
power to “prosecute any inquiry necessary to its duties in any part 
of the United States.”205 The FTC is further authorized to “gather 
and compile information concerning, and to investigate from time 
to time the organization, business, conduct, practices, and 
management of any person, partnership, or corporation engaged in 
or whose business affects commerce.”206 In addition, the legislative 
history of Section 5 evinces a clear Congressional intent that the 
authority the FTC exercises be “evolutionary and wide-
reaching.”207 
Deceptive trade practices include: false representations, 
sales of hazardous or systematically defective products or services 
without adequate disclosures, failure to disclose information, use 
of bait and switch techniques, failure to perform promised services, 
and failure to meet warranty obligations.208 In terms of such 
practices, the FTC pursues companies who “exploit consumer 
ignorance or create a false sense of trust.”209 The FTC also has 
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shifted to focusing on broken consumer expectations, which 
incorporate “the universe of preexisting consumer backgrounds, 
norms, and dispositions,” in addition to elements of design and 
functionality factors.210 The FTC takes consumers “as it finds 
them,” with all of their cognitive limitations, and prohibits 
exploitation of those limitations.211  
In considering whether a harm is outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition in terms of 
“unfair” trade practices, the FTC takes into account both the cost to 
consumers to remedy the harm and the cost to society in general.212 
In essence, this inquiry attempts to separate those instances where 
consumers are able to protect themselves from those where they 
are unable to do so.213 If consumers could reasonably have avoided 
the harm, the FTC will not find a trade practice to be unfair.214 
Accordingly, most FTC enforcement actions focus on behavior 
that unreasonably takes advantage of or exploits vulnerable 
consumers.215 However, the FTC also considers whether a trade 
practice violates established public policy.216 
The evolutionary and wide-ranging nature of the unfairness 
standard is the result Congress’s deliberate intention to frame that 
standard in general terms.217 Congress recognized it was not 
possible to draft a complete set of unfair trade practices, without 
creating regulatory loopholes or the list quickly becoming 
outdated.218 The breadth of Section 5 is apparent in that it 
authorizes the FTC to take action against unfair practices that more 
specific statutes have not yet contemplated.219 Indeed, the FTC has 
the authority to determine a practice is unfair, even if it is 
otherwise lawful.220 The result is that the FTC has significant 
flexibility in addressing new problems.221  
The broad scope of authority Section 5 provides is ideal for 
responding to the challenges posed by new technologies.222 Partly 
as a result of this, the FTC has been able to quickly respond to 
technological change.223 In addition, the FTC has shown it is 
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capable of fostering emerging technologies while protecting 
consumers, as it has done in response to the rise of the Internet and 
the Internet of Things.224 The FTC has been able to do this at least 
in part because the unfair and deceptive practices standard is 
largely technology neutral.225 
 
E. The FTC can and Should Exercise its 
Section 5 Authority 
 
 Of particular relevance to emerging technologies, and AI 
specifically, the FTC has shown itself to be capable of regulating 
the communication, organizational, and design aspects of new 
technologies.226 It has acted to protect consumers from privacy and 
other harms, for example, by notifying commercial firms of their 
obligation not to act unfairly or deceptively in the design, sale, and 
use of emerging technologies that interact with consumers.227 In 
addition to the broad authority to regulate emerging technologies, 
the FTC’s efforts are further enabled to respond to unfair and 
deceptive trade practices by the diverse set of tools at its 
disposal.228  
 Although much of the FTC’s enforcement activity, vis-à-
vis emerging technologies, has been principally in the area of 
privacy and data protection, there is no reason that the FTC cannot 
also apply its broad Section 5 authority to machine learning and 
other automated decision-making processes. During its history, the 
FTC has repeatedly “recalibrated” how emerging technologies are 
used to deceive or harm consumers.229 And given its move to assert 
its authority in regard to the Internet of Things, the FTC does not 
need any new grant of authority to confront other new 
technologies.230 Rather, it is enough if a new technology is used in 
commerce to harm or mislead consumers.231  
 Indeed, the FTC has begun to address the issue of 
algorithms in the privacy context.232 Further, the many tools the 
FTC has – including disclosures and design requirements – can 
help ameliorate the harms that algorithmic decision-making 
systems pose.233 The FTC also has looked to hold commercial 
 
224 Id. at 788, 814, 825. 
225 Calo, supra note 13, at 428. 
226 Hartzog, supra note 52, at 788. 
227 Id.  
228 Id. at 812. 
229 Id. at 813–14. 
230 Id. at 814. 
231 Id.  
232 Id. at 808–09. 
233 Id. at 809. The FTC, for example, can “refine and articulate technology-
specific disclosure rules” where needed. Id. at 818. And in the privacy arena, the 





entities accountable “for design choices that indirectly harm 
consumers.”234 Because AI often is employed in the backend of 
systems with no direct consumer interface, this approach offers a 
potential solution to harms caused by hidden AI. It could also 
address harms caused by third parties, since those who facilitate 
“the wrongful conduct of another” will also trigger FTC action 
under this theory.235  
For a trade practice to be unfair, the harm must be 
substantial.236 The harm can be monetary, but it also may 
encompass unwarranted health and safety risks.237 Thus, AI 
technologies that pose such risks can and should meet the 
unfairness standard.238 Many algorithmic decision-making 
processes, however, will not fall under this category of harm. 
Further, trivial, speculative, and “other more subjective types of 
harm” generally do not constitute an unfair practice.239 Since in 
many cases it may not be clear the exact extent to which a decision 
made by an AI system has injured a particular consumer, it may be 
difficult to establish the requisite level of harm.  
On the other hand, notions of what constitute an unfair 
harm continue to evolve, and there is some indication courts may 
be open to recognizing more subjective, non-monetary harms 
under Section 5.240 In addition, the FTC has clarified that a small 
or incremental injury may constitute sufficient injury if it harms a 
large number of consumers or if it “raises a significant risk of 
concrete harm.”241 And even where harms might be incremental 
for only a single individual, if those harms pose a collective 
problem, the FTC may still be able to act on them.242 Further, the 
FTC may consider “the cost to society in general” in determining 
whether there are countervailing benefits to consumers or 
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 The FTC’s authority to promulgate rules defining unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices is limited, and therefore it must enforce 
its authority indirectly on a case-by-case basis.244 As such, and 
because it generally lacks the ability to assess civil penalties, the 
FTC mostly relies on settlements resulting from its enforcement 
activities to communicate the rules it wants companies to follow.245 
In addition, due to staff and budget constraints, the FTC often must 
rely on informal complaints and self-reporting of potential 
violations.246 The FTC’s Section 5 authority, furthermore, does not 
extend to non-profit organizations, common carriers, financial 
institutions, and certain other entities, nor can it regulate harms 
committed by consumers in non-commercial contexts.247  
Despite these limitations, the FTC has a formidable 
reputation as an enforcement authority, and commercial entities, 
and their lawyers, pay close attention to its orders and decisions.248 
For example, when the FTC issues a complaint, it is published on 
the FTC’s website, which often generates significant attention in 
the privacy community.249 One reason for this is the fear firms 
have of the FTC’s auditing process, which not only is “exhaustive 
and demanding,” but can last for as long as 20 years.250 As such, 
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the FTC settles most of the enforcement actions it initiates.251 
Firms are motivated to settle with the FTC because they can avoid 
having to admit any wrongdoing in exchange for taking remedial 
measures, and thus they also avoid the costs to their reputation 
from apologizing.252  
Though done by necessity, the rule-making process the 
FTC engages in with its consent orders and settlement agreements 
can be of benefit when regulating emerging technologies.253 For 
one, it allows the flexibility needed to adapt to new and rapidly 
changing situations.254 Further, the FTC can wait and see if an 
industry consensus develops around a particular standard before 
codifying that rule through its enforcement actions.255 As with the 
common law, which has long demonstrated the ability to adjust to 
technological changes iteratively, the FTC’s incremental case-by-
case approach can help minimize the risks of producing incorrect 
or inappropriate regulatory policy outcomes.256  
In addition to its use of consent orders and settlement 
agreements, the FTC has created a type of “soft law” by issuing 
guidelines, press releases, workshops, and white papers.257 Unlike 
in enforcement actions, where the FTC looks at a company’s 
conduct and sees how its behavior compares to industry standards, 
the FTC arrives at the best practices it develops for guidance 
purposes through a “deep and ongoing engagement with all 
stakeholders.”258 As such, not only is the FTC’s authority broad 
enough to regulate the use of emerging technologies such as AI in 
commerce, but the FTC’s enforcement actions also constitute a 
body of jurisprudence the FTC can rely on to address the real and 
potential harms that stem from the deployment of consumer-
oriented AI.259  
Given its broad grant of authority, the regulatory tools at its 
disposal, and its experience dealing with emerging technologies, 
the FTC is currently in the best position to take the lead in 
regulating AI. The FTC’s leadership is sorely needed to fill in the 
remaining – and quite large –  gaps in those few sectoral laws that 
specifically address AI and algorithmic decision-making.260 
Several factors make the FTC the ideal agency for this role. First, 
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the FTC can use its broad Section 5 powers to respond rapidly and 
nimbly to the types of unanticipated regulatory issues AI is likely 
to create.261  
Second, the FTC has an established history of approaching 
emerging technologies with “a light regulatory touch” during their 
beginning stages, waiting to increase its regulatory efforts only 
once the technology has become more established.262 This 
approach provides the innovative space needed for new 
technologies such as AI to develop to their full potential. Thus, as 
it has in the past, the FTC would focus on disclosure requirements 
rather than conduct prohibition, and take a case-by-case approach 
rather than rely on rulemaking.263 Also, as it has traditionally done, 
the FTC can hold public events on consumer-related AI and issue 
reports and white papers to guide industry.264  
In other words, the FTC has long taken a co-regulatory 
approach to regulation, which it can and should proceed to do with 
AI. As in other emerging technology areas, this will help industry 
continue to grow and innovate, while allowing for the calibration 
among all relevant stakeholders of the “appropriate expectations” 
concerning the use and deployment of AI decision-making 
systems.265 At the same time, the FTC should use its regulatory 
powers to nudge, and when necessary, push companies to refrain 
from engaging in unfair and deceptive trade practices in the design 
and deployment of AI systems.266 The FTC should also place the 
onus on firms that design and implement those systems to ensure 
misplaced or unrealistic consumer expectations about AI are 
corrected.267  
By  nudging (or pushing) firms in this way, the FTC can 
“gradually impose a set of sticky default practices that companies 
can only deviate from if they very explicitly notify consumers.”268 
In terms of disclosure requirements, as it has done in other 
contexts, the FTC can develop rules and guidelines for “when and 
how a company must disclose information to avoid deception and 
protect a consumer from harm,” which can include requiring firms 
to adopt the equivalent of a privacy policy.269 Given the black box 
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like nature of most algorithmic decision-making processes, there is 
much that AI developers might have to disclose to prevent those 
processes from being deemed unfair or deceptive.270   
In addition, given its broad authority under Section 5, the 
FTC is able to address small, nuanced changes in AI design that 
could adversely affect consumers, but that other areas of law, such 
as tort, may not be able to adequately handle.271 Again, this is 
important because AI and algorithmic decision-making can pose 
profound and systemic risks of harm, even though the actual harm 
to individual consumers may be small or hard to quantify. And as 
it has done in the area of privacy, the FTC can become the de facto 
federal agency authority charged with protecting consumers from 
harms caused by AI systems and other algorithmic decision-
making processes.272  
The FTC also can, and should, seek to work with other 
agencies to address AI-related harms, given that the regulatory 
efforts of other agencies will still occur and be needed in specific 
sectors or industries, which would impact and be relevant to the 
FTC’s efforts as well.273 Agency cooperation is essential to 
ensuring regulatory consistency, accuracy, and efficiency in the 
type of complex, varied technological landscape that AI 
presents.274 This should not be a problem as the FTC’s Section 5 
authority overlaps regularly with the authority of other agencies, 
and the FTC itself has a history of cooperating with those 
agencies.275 Further, the FTC can use its experience working with 
other agencies to build standards and policy consensus within the 
regulatory community and among stakeholders.276  
The overarching role the FTC has played in protecting 
consumer privacy within the United States also has given it 
legitimacy within the wider privacy community. The FTC has been 
pivotal over time in promoting international confidence in the 
United States’ ability to regulate privacy by for example acting as 
the essential mechanism for enforcing the Safe Harbor Agreement 
with the European Union.277 As it takes on a similar overarching 
regulatory role for AI and algorithmic decision-making processes 
in this country, the FTC should gain a similar level of legitimacy 
internationally. This is important given the increasingly cross-
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border nature of AI research and development.  
So far, the FTC has not pushed the full extent of its 
authority under Section 5.278 Under a co-regulatory model such as 
that followed by the FTC, firms are much more willing and 
motivated to commit to voluntary codes of conduct if faced with a 
credible threat of stricter government regulation if they fail to 
abide by the agreed upon standards.279 Thus, the FTC should 
consider actively pursuing strategies to enforce its unfair and 
deceptive trade practices authority in the realm of AI to incentivize 
companies to participate more fully in the co-regulatory process.280  
The FTC also has the authority to expand its regulatory 
reach under Section 5, and should consider new strategies for 
doing so.281 Indeed, the FTC can and should “push in bolder and 
more aggressive directions,” in light of the risk of harm that AI is 
likely to continue to pose.282 Because of the nimbleness of the 
FTC, it is the ideal federal agency to regulate the AI landscape, 
which, at this point in time, is subject to much uncertainty.283 
Indeed, as one observer has noted, “[n]o other agency has such a 
broad scope of power over so many different industries,” given 
that any industry where consumers can be found is subject to the 
FTC’s enforcement power.284  
 As one example, the FTC can and should encourage the AI 
industry to develop codes of conduct for AI research and 
development and algorithmic decision-making, and then enforce 
those codes under Section 5’s deception prong, treating a firm’s 
failure to abide by the relevant code they have agreed to abide by 
as “a presumptive violation.”285 To increase firms’ incentive to 
participate in this process, the FTC should also decline to give 
favorable treatment in enforcement matters to those firms that 
refuse to abide by the developed codes.286 Further, the FTC should 
treat all adopted and approved codes of conduct as having 
established industry standards, thus making them a relevant factor 
in determining the issue of “reasonableness” under Section 5’s 
unfairness prong.287  
 This is not to say that additional legislation by Congress to 
address the risks and challenges posed by AI decision-making 
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systems is not needed. For example, given that academic and other 
non-profit institutions are involved in AI research and development 
as well, the FTC should be given authority over non-commercial 
entities whose practices also harm consumers.288 Further, granting 
“explicit rulemaking authority” to the FTC would allow it to take a 
more systematic approach to regulating AI.289 Short of that, 
though, and rather than rushing to hastily craft new legislation that 
may be ill-suited to the challenges of regulating AI, Congress 
should ensure the FTC first has the resources – including the 
necessary technical expertise – it needs to exert its existing 
authority effectively.290  
 
VI.     CONCLUSION 
 
 AI undoubtedly holds enormous potential for addressing 
many of society’s greatest challenges and will likely bring 
substantial benefits to consumers and the public at large. For these 
reasons, the ability to continue to innovate and develop beneficial 
AI technologies should not be unduly hampered. At the same time, 
AI, and algorithmic decision-making processes in general, pose 
significant risks and challenges of their own. Thus, while the most 
effective method of regulating AI, at least in the near term, is a co-
regulatory approach in which the government, industry, and other 
stakeholders come together to work out appropriate governance 
standards, there still needs to be an effective oversight body that 
can step in when and where necessary to enforce those standards.  
Although Congress could create a new, overarching federal 
agency tasked with the regulation of AI, it has shown little 
inclination over the years to enact comprehensive legislation 
dealing with this or other similar emerging technology issues. 
Perhaps, as the industry develops and matures, this will be the path 
Congress chooses to take. However, in the meantime, the FTC is 
more than capable of using its broad authority under Section 5 to 
prevent the tech industry from engaging in unfair and deceptive 
trade practices in the design and deployment of AI technologies. 
The FTC can and should use the full extent of that authority to do 
so. Further, Congress should give the FTC the resources and rule-
making authority necessary to effectively regulate in this area. In 
the meantime, the FTC’s central regulatory role offers the best path 
forward to govern AI safely and effectively. 
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